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#ZimElections2018:	Charismatic	Appeals	Vs
Performance	Legitimacy
As	Zimbabwe	heads	to	the	first	Mugabe-less	polls,	LSE’s	McDonald	Lewanika	analyses	the	campaigns	two	leading
Presidential	candidates.
Behold	the	New
On	July	30,	2018,	Zimbabwe	will	have	its	first	post-Mugabe	harmonised	election,	where	23	candidates	from	22
political	parties	will	engage	in	mortal	political	combat	for	the	country’s	presidency.	Over	1648	candidates	from	at
least	55	political	parties	(about	220	are	independent	candidates)	will	compete	for	210	National	Assembly	seats,	while
7564	candidates	will	run	to	fill	1964	places	in	89	local	authorities.¹	Besides	not	featuring	Robert	Mugabe	and	his	late
nemesis	Morgan	Tsvangirai	in	the	presidential	race,	the	election	features	the	highest	number	of	presidential	hopefuls
in	Zimbabwe’s	electoral	history	and	offers	an	entirely	new	slate	of	contenders,	as	none	of	them	has	contested	in	a
presidential	election	before.
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The	two	leading	contenders	are	President	Emmerson	Mnangagwa	of	the	ruling	Zanu-PF	and	Advocate	Nelson
Chamisa	of	the	Movement	for	Democratic	Change	(MDC)-Alliance.	For	the	presidential	race,	Afrobarometer
suggests	a	statistical	dead	heat,	with	40	per	cent	(down	from	43	per	cent	in	May	2018)	of	polled	voters	saying	they
would	vote	for	Mnangagwa,	and	37	per	cent	(up	from	31	per	cent	in	May	2018)	saying	they	would	vote	for	Chamisa.
Twenty-one	percent	of	those	surveyed	either	refused	to	share	their	voting	intentions	or	were	undecided.	This	article
provides	an	overview	of	how	the	two	leading	contenders	for	the	Presidency	have	gone	about	winning	the	hearts	and
minds	of	Zimbabweans	in	the	2018	electoral	race.
The	Candidates:	Chamisa	the	Cobra	vs.	Mnangagwa	the	Crocodile
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Mnangagwa	and	Chamisa	come	from	different	political	stocks,	traditions,	and	generations.	Mnangagwa,	nicknamed
Ngwena	(the	Crocodile),	is	a	77-year-old	veteran	of	the	liberation	war,	whose	political	tradition	is	steeped	in	the
security	sector.	Mnangagwa	is	a	shrewd	operator,	who	despite	limited	charisma	has	bent	the	Zanu-PF	and
Zimbabwean	political	steel	to	his	will.	His	survival	in	Zanu-PF	has	often	been	through	outmaneuvering	opponents
strategically,	and,	as	November	2017	showed,	forcefully,	rather	than	democratically	or	through	popular	politics.
Chamisa,	nicknamed	Nero	(or	Cobra),	is	a	charismatic	40-year-old	former	student	and	youth	leader,	who	is	a	trained
marketer,	evangelist,	political	scientist,	and	lawyer.	He	is	given	to	popular	and	populist	politics,	and	has	consistently
run	and	won	elections	at	multiple	levels	since	the	late	90’s,	bar	a	loss	in	the	race	to	be	Secretary	General	of	the	MDC
in	2014.	Mnangagwa	and	Chamisa	both	see	opportunities	to	increase	their	political	stock	in	this	election.
Basic	Campaign	Platforms:	Chamisa’s	SMART	vs.	Mnangagwa’s	People’s	Manifesto
For	Mnangagwa’s	Zanu-PF,	the	election	is	an	opportunity	to	legitimise	the	November	2017	coup.	In	this	effort,	Zanu-
PF	has	been	faced	with	the	onerous	propaganda	task	of	paradoxically	arguing	for	the	preservation	of	the	old
(legacy),	while	also	arguing	that	it	has	and	is	facilitating	change	(new	dispensation),	although	presided	over	by	the
old	who	fought	in	the	liberation	struggle.	Zanu-PF’s	Manifesto	is	summed	up	in	its	tagline,	“Unite,	Fight	corruption,
Develop,	Re-Engage,	Create	Jobs”.	The	Zanu-PF	strategy	seems	to	have	been	to	eat	their	cake	and	have	it,	through
trying	to	limit	Mnangagwa’s	record	to	the	eight	months	he	has	been	president,	rather	than	the	38	years	he	has	been
in	government.	This	approach	has	proved	onerous,	as	part	of	Mnangagwa’s	appeal	is	experience,	yet	the	bulk	of	that
experience	has	been	as	Mugabe’s	right-hand	man.
For	Nelson	Chamisa’s	MDC-Alliance,	the	elections	present	the	best	opportunity	in	their	20-year	history	to	facilitate
regime	change.	This	is	on	account	of	their	unprecedented	ability	to	campaign	in	previously	“no	go”	rural	areas;	the
presence	of	international	observers	previously	banned	by	Mugabe,	and	a	deformed	Zanu-PF,	weaker	than	it	was	in
2013	on	account	of	factional	fights.	Also,	there	is	a	perception	that	Zanu-PF’s	control	over	the	security	sector	beyond
the	army	is	limited,	leading	to	perceptions	of	Zanu-PF’s	inability	to	master	the	cohesion	to	facilitate	the	kind	of	grand
electoral	theft	that	it	has	been	accused	of	perpetrating	in	the	past.	The	young	voting	population	has	buoyed
Chamisa’s	candidature,	and	his	relative	youth	has	spurred	him	on.
Chamisa’s	central	value	proposition	is	to	unsettle	the	old	gerontocratic	political	order,	which	he	alleges	Zanu-PF
represents,	through	ushering	in	a	generational	transition.	His	campaign’s	tagline	from	the	MDC-Alliance’s
Sustainable	and	Modernization	Agenda	for	Real	Transformation	(SMART)	Pledge,	is	“Behold	the	new:	Change	that
delivers.”	However,	like	Zanu-PF,	contradictions	also	abound,	amid	allegations	that	although	young,	Chamisa’s
rhetoric	and	positioning	on	some	social	issues	are	as	conservative	as	those	of	the	old	order,	if	not	worse,	especially
as	it	relates	to	women,	gender,	and	gender	roles.
The	Political	Machineries:	Talented	Improvisation	vs.	Command	and	Control
Chamisa	is	aided	by	his	magnetism,	charisma,	and	exceptional	oratory	skills.	His	appeals	to	the	electorate	have
been	both	charismatic	and	programmatic	on	account	of	the	pillars	of	his	SMART	campaign	platform.	At	the	beginning
of	his	campaign,	Chamisa	inherited	a	broke	party,	which	was	deeply	divided,	had	lost	the	support	of	international
partners	and	the	former	white	farmers,	and	was	barely	in	touch	with	its	civil	society	and	labour	roots.	But	Chamisa
has	mitigated	these	institutional	deficiencies	through	leveraging	the	MDC’s	mobilising	power,	and	the	strategic
experience	of	some	of	Tsvangirai’s	old	lieutenants.	He	has	also	been	able	to	build	a	competent	voluntary	campaign
team	supported	by	a	sleuth	of	strategic	technical	operators	from	across	generations	of	former	student	leaders.	In	the
wake	of	limited	resources,	Chamisa	has	appealed	for	individual	donations	from	supporters	through	mobile	money,
and	his	party’s	campaign	has	primarily	hinged	on	low	cost	canvassing	through	door-to-door	campaigns,	and	very	few
media	ad	buys.	This	talented	improvisation	has	done	well	for	Chamisa	in	the	campaign,	but	questions	remain	on
whether	the	powerful	MDC-Alliance	mobilisation	machine	can	turn	out	the	vote	for	Chamisa	on	Election	Day.
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Mnangagwa	presides	over	a	formidable	institution	in	Zanu-PF,	whose	conflation	with	the	state	has	readily	presented
him	with	a	solid	political	machine	that	has	in	the	past	churned	out	victories	for	his	predecessor,	often	at	his
command.	Post	the	2017	coup,	Mnangagwa	brought	back,	into	the	Zanu-PF	commissariat,	the	team	of	soldiers	and
spies	that	presided	over	the	Zanu-PF	2013	campaign.	On	assuming	the	Zanu-PF	mantle,	perceptions	were	rife	that
Mnangagwa	was	a	weak	candidate.	Because	of	perceptions	of	Mnangagwa’s	“dullness”	the	Zanu-PF	political
machine	has	been	in	propaganda	overdrive	building	up	their	candidate	and	making	him	shine	through	contrived
campaign	images	of	an	affable,	smiling	Mnangagwa	and	short	clips	of	choreographed	small	vocal	doses.
Resultantly,	Mnangagwa	has	turned	out	to	be	a	candidate	who	shines	more	on	account	of,	not	what	he	says	or	does,
but	what	others	say	about	him,	and	do	on	his	behalf.	His	lack	of	charisma	has	led	at	some	points	during	the
campaign	trail	to	large	crowds	and	supporters,	which	the	machine	turned	out	to	his	rallies,	leaving	before	and	during
his	long	addresses.	Lacking	charisma,	Mnangagwa’s	appeals	have	thus	been	mainly	programmatic,	centred	on
trying	to	appeal	through	performance	legitimacy.
Mnangagwa	has	mitigated	his	own	shortcomings	through	ensuring	that	Zanu-PF	rallies	are	entertainment	filled	with
some	of	the	best	artists	in	the	country	performing,	while	also	leaning	heavily	on	his	deputy	General	Constantine
Chiwenga,	who	despite	his	poor	English	pronunciation,	has	proved	to	be	quite	an	eloquent	and	engaging
campaigner	when	he	resorts	to	addressing	multitudes	in	his	native	Shona.	Zanu-PF	campaigners	have	also
attempted	to	present	being	“boring”	as	being	serious	and	presidential,	comparing	it	to	Chamisa’s	“entertaining”	but
hyperbolic	and	“unrealistic”	pronouncements.
Despite	the	preceding,	Mnangagwa	has	hedged	his	electoral	success	not	on	rallies,	but	on	the	organisation	and
mobilisation	of	the	Zanu-PF	faithful	as	a	function	of	the	Zanu-PF	political	machine.	As	a	result,	Zanu-PF,	the
institution,	is	also	the	primary	campaign	strategy,	centred	on	the	activation	of	its	elaborate	cell	structures	that	will	be
mobilised	to	turn	out	on	Election	Day.	However,	part	of	Mnangagwa’s	challenge	is	that	the	Zanu-PF	structures	may
not	be	as	easily	given	to	command	and	loyalty	as	they	were	in	2013.	Already	there	are	murmurings	of	a	rogue
campaign	within	the	structures	for	people	to	vote	according	to	their	interests	and	conscience.
Campaign	Strategy:	“Touch	Me,	See	Me,	Feel	Me”	vs.	”Watch	Me	Do	the	Job”
Social	media	is	one	of	the	main	deviations	in	the	2018	elections,	from	traditional	campaigning	in	Zimbabwe.	For	good
and	bad	reasons,	Chamisa	was	trending	on	social	media,	and	set	the	agenda	and	discourse	in	ways	that	the
opposition	has	in	the	past	failed	to	do.	But	as	the	Afrobarometer	report	from	July	2017	shows,	the	hype	must	not	be
believed,	at	least	not	as	a	generalisation.	The	survey	shows	that	for	rural	Zimbabwe,	government	radio	remains	the
media	of	the	people	with	word	of	mouth	and	meetings	as	the	other	primary	sources	of	intel	on	the	elections.	For
urban	Zimbabwe	it	is	government	television	and	radio,	word	of	mouth,	social	media,	and	newspapers.	These	sources
are	instructive	in	as	far	as	they	tell	us	whether	the	two	primary	gladiators	have	been	attempting	to	win	hearts	and
minds	through	the	appropriate	means.	It	is	good	then,	that	both	Chamisa	and	Mnangagwa,	while	taking	to	Twitter
and	Facebook,	have	also	traversed	the	length	and	breadth	of	Zimbabwe	doing	rallies	and	meetings.
Chamisa	has	been	running	a	“touch	me,	see	me,	feel	me”	campaign	where	the	objective	is	to	meet	as	many	people
as	is	possible.	His	target	has	primarily	been	rural	Zimbabwe,	formerly	thought	to	be	Zanu-PF	strongholds.	Given	his
limited	access	to	government	television	and	radio,	this	strategy	has	been	inspired.	It	will	no	doubt	help	to	increase
Chamisa’s	tally	in	these	areas,	but	the	usual	approach	is	to	forget	about	one’s	opponents	strongholds	and	focus	on
areas	that	one’s	party	can	win,	that	is	battleground	constituencies	and	one’s	marginal	strongholds.	As	such	while	the
target	to	increase	presidential	votes	may	be	met,	it	is	possible	that	the	strategy	may	cost	the	MDC-Alliance
parliamentary	seats	in	the	neglected	battleground	and	marginal	opposition	constituencies,	especially	in	the	cities.	So
while	Chamisa	has	been	fighting	hard	in	Zanu	country,	his	perceived	base	in	urban	areas	and	the	youth	have	hardly
been	directly	appealed	to	by	his	campaign,	leaving	them	open	to	Mnangagwa	and	his	attacks	on	the	MDC’s	record	in
local	government.	Mnangagwa’s	charge	into	previously	perceived	opposition	spaces	will	not	get	him	the	majority	of
votes	but	because	in	reality	post	the	2013	elections	the	cities	ceased	to	be	MDC	strongholds	becoming
battlegrounds,	they	are	ripe	for	Zanu-PF	capture	at	least	at	parliamentary	level.
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Mnangagwa	has	spared	no	expense	in	the	2018	election	campaign,	with	a	typical	spend	rate	of	about	USD	200
million	per	month	since	April	2018.	Zanu-PF	has	splashed	billboards	across	the	country,	monopolised	the	airwaves
on	both	public	and	pseudo-private²	platforms	as	well	as	print	and	new	media	through	sponsored	outreaches.
Resultantly,	Mnangagwa	has	been	able	to	send	his	carefully	curated	image	to	millions	of	households	every	day
through	radio	and	TV,	and	has	invaded	millions	of	Facebook	and	Twitter	timelines	through	an	army	of	new	media
hacks,	called	Varakashi,	reported	to	be	well-financed	and	powered	by	hundreds	of	government-owned	TelOne	cell
phone	lines	and	data	bundles.		Mnangagwa	has	taken	comfort	in	incumbency	and	made	fewer	rally	type	campaign
stops	than	Chamisa.	This	is	due	in	part	to	the	reality,	that	since	inauguration	as	president,	Mnangagwa	has	been
running	a	“permanent	campaign”.	He	has	successfully	conflated	the	business	of	government	with	his	election	efforts.
As	such,	every	bank,	mine,	business	openings,	groundbreaking	ceremonies,	deals	signed,	and	visits	made	as	state
president,	have	all	fed	into	a	governing	performance	narrative	used	to	evidence	his	capacity	to	voters.
In	short,	while	Chamisa	has	been	campaigning	for	the	presidency,	Mnangagwa	has	focused	more	on	doing	the	job	of
president,	banking	more	on	performance	legitimacy	than	on	performance	politics	ala	Chamisa.	This	has	left	Chamisa
and	the	MDC-Alliance	to	run	against	Mnangagwa’s	8-month	in	office,	having	failed	to	launch	a	meaningful	attack	on
his	38-year	long	record	in	government.	In	effect,	what	Mnangagwa	has	successfully	done	is	to	remain	fairly	detached
from	the	rat	race	to	replace	him,	forcing	Chamisa	and	the	opposition	to	run	against	themselves	through	fighting	each
other	and	for	Chamisa,	his	own	guffs	and	gaffes,	hyperbole	and	salty	jokes.
Too	Close	to	Call
As	30	July	approaches,	Chamisa	has	the	momentum,	but	Mnangagwa	continues	to	have	the	upper	hand	on	account
of	incumbency,	a	reliable	political	machine,	as	well	as	a	wide	berth	of	opposition	political	forces	keener	on	fighting
each	other	than	they	are	to	fight	him.	Before	his	assent,	Mnangagwa’s	history	and	association	with	the	Gukurahundi
atrocities,	limited	charisma,	and	37	years	as	Mugabe’s	henchman,	made	him	a	very	uninteresting	political	prospect
that	many	thought	was	unelectable.	However,	with	elections	beckoning,	he	has	been	spared	the	scrutiny	of	his
record	and	character	that	could	have	been	his	demise.	His	“Varakashi”	on	the	other	hand,	have	done	enough	to
make	some	sections	of	the	electorate	doubt	the	uprightness	of	Chamisa’s	character,	his	maturity,	ability	and
readiness	to	lead.	The	presidential	race	remains	a	David	versus	Goliath	Affair.	If	Chamisa	is	able	to	turn	the
multitudes	from	his	rallies	into	votes	on	Election	Day,	he	may	yet	cause	an	upset	against	this	Goliath	of	an	opponent
who	has	been	in	politics	for	longer	than	Chamisa	has	been	alive.
This	article	was	first	published	on	Heinrich	Boll	Stiftung	Southern	Africa.
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¹Zimbabwe’s	parliament	is	a	bicameral.	National	Assembly	has	270	seats,	of	which	210	are	directly	contested	using
the	first	past	the	post	system	in	single-member	districts,	while	60	seats	are	reserved	for	women	through	proportional
representation	using	a	party	list	system	of	6	per	province.	The	second	chamber,	Senate,	is	an	80-member	senate
where	60	seats	are	filled	through	direct	elections	(6	per	province)	while	the	Chiefs	Council	fills	16,	two
representatives	of	the	disabled	plus	the	Senate	President	and	a	deputy.
²Members	of	Zanu-PF	or	people	associated	with	them	primarily	own	most	of	the	privately	owned	radio	stations.
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